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THE PRESS AND THE OPPRESSED-A STUDY OF PREJUDICIAL
NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES*
Part II: Some Speculations and Proposals
CAROLYN JAFFE
Miss Jaffe is a member of the Illinois Bar. She is presently serving as Law Clerk to the Honorable
Julius J. Hoffman of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. She re-
ceived the LL.B. degree in 1963 and the LL.M. degree in 1964 from the Northwestern University
School of Law, the latter under a Ford Foundation Fellowship in Criminal Law. Miss Jaffe has served
as Abstractor of Recent Cases for this Journal since 1961 and acted as Managing Editor of the North-
western University Law Review in 1962-1963.
When the news media publicize information commonly referred to as "prejudicial publicity," a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized. In Part I of this two-part article, pub-
lished in the March, 1965 issue of the Journal, 56 J. CRI. L., C. & P.S. 1 (1965), the author first
examined the applicable standards of impartiality which a jury must meet in order for a trial to be
constitutionally "fair," and then defined that "prejudicial publicity" which can render a jury un-
constitutionally partial and hence a trial not constitutionally fair. Finally, existing methods which
have been used in an attempt to prevent defendants from being convicted by juries rendered partial
by publicity were critically examined, with emphasis on the effect of each of these methods upon the
co-existing interests of the press, the defendant, and the Government which are sought to be pre-
served.
In Part II, the author examines the possibility of expanding some of the existing solutions, with
emphasis on the importance of formulating and making known to the press, bar, and police a set of
standards delineating the kinds of material which are likely to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. After
examining the sources of prejudicial publicity and noting the probable futility of internal control by
the press, the author proposes a remedial statute. Results of a poll of lawyers, police officials and
newsmen conducted by the author are tabulated in appendices to Part IL-EIITOR.
IV: EXPANSION OF EXISTING METHODS
When the conclusion that existing means are in-
adequate was made, it was advanced not to state
that these means are inherently inadequate, but,
rather, with the qualification that they are inade-
quate as currently practiced by American courts.
Perhaps presently existing methods could be
utilized in such a way as to solve the problem with-
out resort to more radical and severe means which
might represent the beginning of a trend that could
result in gradual but eventual erosion of freedom of
the press. However, this is not to say that the exist-
ing means will in fact be so utilized; rather it is
suggested as a possible solution short of, and, per-
haps preferable to, more drastic means.
To speak of preventing conduct-here, the pub-
lication prior to termination of a criminal case of
* This article was submitted by the author in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master
of Laws, Northwestern University School of Law, May
1964. Minor changes have been made to bring it up to
date.
material which might prejudice the jury against
the defendant-is to speak either of actually pun-
ishing someone or of putting him in fear of possible
consequences which may harm him at some future
time, unless he is willing to cease that conduct
without external compulsion or persuasion.
It has been suggested that the news media are
capable of voluntarily refraining from publishing
prejudicial material, particularly if the Bar were
to prescribe and itself adhere to reasonable stand-
ards to be followed. 120 Voluntary action has in fact
120 Daly, Ensuring Fair Trials and a Free Press: A
Task for the Press and the Bar Alike, 50 A.B.A.J. 1037
(1964); Current Events, 22 A.B.A.J. 79, 80 (1936)
(quoting from an editorial in the Jan. 18, 1936 issue of
the Toledo News-Bee). See LIEBLING, THE PREss 159-
60 (1960); Editorial, Publicity Scandals Demand Exer-
cise of Authority, 20 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 82, 83 (1936). A
proposed code of ethics for newsmen regarding publicity
of trials is presented at 22 A.B.A.J. 79 (1936). See
Brownell, Freedom and Responsibility of Ike Press in a
Free Country, 24 FoRDHAm L. REv. 178, 182, 186 (1955).
See Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REv.
197, 213 n.58 (1963), for a description of some volun-
tary action.
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been taken in Rhode Island, where the two Provi-
dence dailies and many other newspapers do not
print any matter regarding a trial which takes
place outside the presence of the jury.Y However,
failure of the legal profession to enforce its own
Canon 2 0 122 breeds disrespect on the part of the
The Oregon State Bar, the Oregon Newspaper Pub-
lishers Association, and the Oregon Association of
Broadcasters have adopted a Joint Statement of Prin-
cples to keep the public fully informed without violat-
ing the rights of any individual. While it fails specifically
to enumerate those kinds of material which may be
prejudicial, the Statement does spell out certain guide-
lines (e.g., good taste, presumption of innocence, fact
that readers and listeners are potential jurors, exploita-
tion of news media by any lawyer considered unprofes-
sional conduct) which both Bar and news media should
follow. The Statement concludes that the members of
the participating associations "testify to their continu-
ing desire to achieve the best possible accomodation of
the rights of the individual and the rights of the public
when these two fundamental precepts appear to be in
conflict in the administration of justice." The author is
indebted to William F. Frye, District Attorney of Lane
County, Ore., for a copy of the Joint Statement.
A subcommittee of the Comittee on Jurisprudence of
the State Bar of Michigan is investigating the problem,
and early indications are that the Committee will
probably recommend the promulgation of rules by the
Michigan Supreme Court laying down guidelines and
covering all law enforcing agencies, attorneys, and mem-
bers of the judiciary, to the effect that no pre-trial
statements be made. Letter from Larry S. Davidow,
Chairman of a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Jurisprudence of the State Bar of Michigan, April 21,
1964.
See also News Article, Suggests "Voluntary Restraint"
on Pretrial News Coverage, Chicago Daily Law Bulle-
tin, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 1, quoting from Edward L. Wright,
Chairman, ABA House of Delegates, and Donald K.
Gillnor, Associate Professor of Journalism, Univ. of
North Dakota.
Cf. the practice of the Psychiatric Institute of the
Municipal Court of Chicago, wherein reports of results
of mental examinations are given only to the referring
judge and the prosectuor only on trial date, and also
before trial to defense counsel on request. Letter from
E. J. Kelliher, M.D., Director, Psychiatric Institute of
the Municipal Court of Chicago, March 24, 1964.
54.03% of the persons responding to the writer's poll
agree ith the statement in the text. See Table I.
"2 Address by Judge Joseph Weisberger Before the
National Conference of State Trial Judges, San Fran-
cisco, Aug. 4, 1962. See Will, supra note 120.
122 Canon 20 of the ABA's Canons of Professional
Ethics condemns statements for publication by lawyers
re pending litigation. See Daly, supra note 120; Sowle,
A Free Press Vs. Fair Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, July
5, 1964, sec. 2, p. 2.
In a significant recent opinion, a unanimous Supreme
Court of New Jersey stated, by way of dictum:
"[Canon 20 prohibits] statements to news media by
prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and their lawyer
staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpa-
tory admissions by the accused, or to the effect that
the case is 'open and shut' against the defendant, and
the like, or with reference to the defendant's prior
criminal record, either of convictions or arrests. Such
press and tends to inhibit press self-control.m Such
strong forces as competition and the desire to sell
newspapers, moreover, would most likely prevent
effective internal control, 24 despite the fact that
this solution in ideology represents the best of all
possible worlds in this area of the law.
Since radio and television serve to inform the
public in brief of all important news events, news-
paper editors and publishers are prone to believe,
and perhaps rightly so, that they must give the
public intricate details of morbid and shocking
crime news in order to continue to prosper. This is
not to say that radio and television are not also
guilty of exposing jurors to prejudicial publicity;125
statements have the capacity to interfere with a fair
trial and cannot be countenanced....
"The ban on statements by the prosecutor and his
aides applies as well to defense counsel. The right of
the state to a fair trial cannot be impeded or diluted
by out-of-court assertions by him to news media on
the subject of his client's innocence. The courtroom is
the place to settle the issue, and comments before or
during the trial which have the capacity to influence
potential or actual jurors... are impermissible.
".... Nothing is suggested herein which proscribes
the reporting of the evidence as it is introduced...
during the course of the trial."
State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841,852 (N.J. 1964).
The court thus is warning attorneys of disciplinary
action which is likely to be imposed in the future under
Canon 20.
m Letter from Brooks IV. Hamilton, Head of the
Dep't of Journalism, Univ. of Maine, March 23, 1964.
"If the Bar Association of America can state a code
of ethics covering the publicity of trials, which are
sensible and which do not violate decent practices of
free publication, and if they can discipline the mem-
bers of their own profession to abide by that code,
they will be met more than half way.., by the great
majority of newspapers."
Current Events, supra note 120, at 80. See also Gold-
farb, Ensuring Fair Trials: The Impropriety of Publicity,
The New Republic, Feb. 29, 1964, p. 11.
12 11.29% of the persons responding to the writer's
poll mentioned competition and commercialism when
indicating that voluntary, internal control by the press
appears unlikely. See Table I. See, e.g., Colegrove,
Attitudes Toward Crime News-A Newspaperman's
Viewpoint, 4 NAT'L PROB. & PaRtit Ass'N J. 313
(1958); Editorial, supra note 120; cf. White, Newspaper
and Radio Coverage of Criminal Trials: A Modern
Dilemma, 41 J. C=. L., C. & P.S. 306 (1950). Contra,
Gallup, What Is Public Opinion?, 4 NAT'L PROB. &
PAsZoLE Ass'NzJ. 305 (1958).
Another view is that "trial by newspaper" is justified
because it serves the purpose of an important obligation
of the journalistic profession: to attempt to reduce
crime. Brown, A Newspaperman's Obligations, 4 NAT'L
PRoB. & PAnoLE Ass'N J. 307, 310 (1958); Mueller,
Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal
Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1961). Bud see
Deland, Crime News Encourages Deliquency and Crimne,
32 J. Ams. Jun. Soc'y 10 (1948).
125 See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963);
Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d
19651
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but it does appear that the greatest culpability lies
with the newspapers.
Conferences between newsmen, members of the
legal profession, and law enforcement officials may
serve to enlighten some members of the journalistic
profession as to the possible deleterious conse-
quences of injudicious coverage of criminal cases.
12 6
For example, a conference on the subject in which
newsmen, police officials, prosecutors, defense at-
torneys, and judges participated, was held at
Northwestern University School of Law under
auspices of the Ford Foundation in May 19 62 .12
Although no proposed solution was unanimously
arrived at, and though newsmen almost uniformly
demanded empirical evidence that publication of
what defense attorneys call prejudicial publicity
in fact causes juries to be prejudiced against de-
fendants 2 s one shining light did emanate from that
conference.
Shortly after it was held, Professor Fred E.
Inbau, co-chairman of the conference, received
from a Florida assistant managing editor who had
participated in the conference a copy of a recom-
mendation which he had sent to the members of his
497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950); Hagans v.
State, 372 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1962); cf.
United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 861 (D. Md. 1961).
126 The annual Short Course for Newsmen in Crime
News Analysis and Reporting at Northwestern Univ.
School of Law, very favorably mentioned in Mueller,
supra note 124, at 25 n.78, attempts to inform members
of the news profession of the possible consequences-
e.g., reversal of otherwise valid convictions-of exten-
sive coverage of criminal cases. See also Prejudicial Ntws
Reporting in Criminal Cases, 1962 Ono ST. BAR ASS'N
R.EP. 773, 774, where lawyers are urged to explain the
legal problems involved to newsmen.
In Maine a voluntary code of conduct has been de-
veloped between the news media, State Police, and
private general hospitals, and a similar code encompas-
sing State hospitals is being prepared. No punishment is
provided, other than that unofficial censure which is
expected to flow from failure to adhere to the standards
established. A jointly drafted code of advisory standards
for Massachusetts is being written by news and Bar
groups. Letter from Brooks W. Hamilton, Head of the
Dep't of Journalism, Univ. of Maine, March 23, 1964.
127 See FREE PREsS-FAIR TRIAL: A REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE i PREJUrCAL NEws
REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES (Inbau ed. 1964). This
publication contains a verbatim transcription of the
Conference, which was conducted by Northwestern
Univ. School of Law and the Medill School of Journal-
ism (Northwestern Univ.) under the direction of co-
chairmen Fred E. Inbau, Professor of Law at North-
western, and David R. Botter, Professor of journalism
at Medill (deceased). ,
128 For the contrary view--tdat the press should prove
that it does not cause prejudice-see Will, supra note
120, at 206-09. See also note 157 infra and accompany-
ing text.
staff and to managing editors of other Florida
newspapers, to the effect that alleged confessions
and prior criminal records should not be alluded to
in publications prior to termination of the trial. 29
But editors so enlightened are few and far be-
tween. It is doubtful whether such programs will
substantially affect enough journalists to come
close to solving the problem. Therefore, we must
speak either in terms of actually punishing some-
one, or of somehow scaring him into prodded, but
not whipped, compliance with the desired standard
of conduct.
Expansion of the available tools of reversing
convictions and granting the appropriate motions
available at the trial level might well serve to scare
the press into the desired moderation in covering
crime news. If it were impossible to obtain an im-
partial jury and hence a valid conviction because
of exposure to publicity, the press would not be
slow to realize that public indignation might even-
tually lead to the imposition of external sanctions,
and would therefore choose self-control in antici-
patory self-defense, since external standards would
doubtless be more stringent and circulation-cutting
than what could voluntarily be adopted by the
press and approved by the judiciary. Mere liberali-
zation of currently prevailing tests of juror im-
partiality and standard of proof of prejudice would
tend toward this result.
The recent case of United States v. Accardo2 is
illustrative. The defendant was convicted of mak-
ing false statements on his income tax returns. Be-
fore and during his trial, his reputation for being in-
volved in Chicago's underworld and the nationwide
crime syndicate was widely publicized by local
newspapers and news broadcasts. Presuming preju-
dice from the circumstances, the Seventh Circuit
reversed on prejudicial publicity grounds. Inas-
much as the reversal and its basis also received
much publicity, 131 the public might well have in-
ferred that, by publishing such articles as caused
Accardo's conviction to be overturned, Chicago
news media were in fact, albeit unintentionally,
aiding organized crime.
In connection with the general problem, a lead-
ing Chicago editorial writer recently stated:
"As a result of prejudicial reporting and com-
12 See FREE PREss-FAiR TRIAL, op. cit. supra note
127, at 202.
130 United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th
Cir. 1962).
"I See, e.g., News Article, Chicago Daily News, Jan.
6, 1962, p. 12, col. 1, published the day after the rever-
sal.
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ment, courts often grant changes of venue, con-
tinuances, and mistrials. Reporting and com-
ment have often been the ground on which
appellate courts have reversed convictions.
"Editors and publishers have little to fear
from the contempt procedure for prejudicial re-
porting or comment. But if they are not careful,
they may be aiding a guilty man to escape pun-
ishment so long as reviewing courts are so sensi-
tive to the presumed effect of what is printed."' ' 2
Moreover, in the great majority of cases, liberali-
zation of the standard of challengeability of jurors
for cause would result in the selection of a panel of
jurors impartial by federal constitutional criteria;
inability to obtain a jury would result only in the
most highly publicized cases. Trial courts in two
recent cases entered what appear to be valid judg-
ments of conviction after having excused all po-
tential jurors who might possibly have been
prejudiced against defendant by reason of pub-
licity.13
In the absence of effective, freely-chosen volun-
tary action, then, extension of the existing remedies
of reversal and trial level remedies may result in
the desired goal through the "scare" technique.
But if those who publish prejudicial information
prove either to be unaware of the possible threat to
their seemingly invulnerable position or to be un-
believing that such a threat could ever materialize,
then actual punishment will remain the only means
of preventing publication of prejudicial material.
The existing contempt power can be invoked
more frequently than at present to constitutionally
punish constructive contempt by the press, so long
as the information published constitutes a clear
and present danger to the sovereign's right to se-
cure the orderly administration of justice--i.e., in
context, to the right of the particular defendant to
a fair trial.M As has been demonstrated, use of the
contempt power in this manner does no violence to
freedom of the press. Presumably, punishment of
past misconduct will deter that contemnor and
those similarly situated from publishing like in-
formation in the future. Of course, the "punish-
2 A. T. Burch, Press Coverage of Trials-Is Cause
of Jusike Hindered?, Chicago Daily News, May 30,
1964, p. 17, col. 8.
113 United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D.
Minn. 1963) (court excused every potential juror who
had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt or in-
nocence); State v. St. Peter, 63 Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.
2d 937 (1963) (court excused all potential jurors who
had read or heard of defendant).
'm See notes 46-64 supra and accompanying text, in
Part I of this article.
ment" must actually punish, rather than merely
slap the offender on the wrist. In light of the eco-
nomic compulsion to publish detailed crime news,
most newspapers would merely write off a moderate
fine as a business expense. For the contempt con-
viction to constitute punishment which would rea-
sonably deter future misconduct by the news
media, really stiff fines against the publishing
corporation and imprisonment of persons directly
responsible for publication, as are imposed under
the successful English system, would seem neces-
sary.
1 3 5
If either the persuasion by fright or punishment
by contempt technique is sought to be employed,
it is equally important that the news media be in-
formed of the standards formulated--of what con-
duct is disapproved. If the fright method derived
from expansion of the test of juror impartiality and
standard of proof of prejudice is to be used, one
responsible for news coverage of criminal cases will
be hesitant to publish material he knows may oc-
casion reversal or impossibility of trial, which in
turn, he apprehends, may lead to the external con-
trols he abhors. If punishment is to be imposed for
constructive contempt, the publisher's awareness
of what specific information must not be published
and when it must not be published will apprise him,
as required by due process, 3' of what he must re-
frain from doing on pain of contempt, and will per-
mit him to act accordingly.
Standards of Conduct
As discussed above, six kinds of material were
categorized as "prejudicial," within the general
criterion that the material might not be admissible
as evidence, and if jurors read or heard the ma-
terial, they might reasonably use it in deciding the
question whether a defendant is guilty. Since the
information might never be admitted in evidence,
the test of prejudice for purposes of punishment
13 See SuLuvAN, TiAL By NEwsPAPER 218-30
(1961), for the view that those in high managerial
positions, rather than reporters, should be held in con-
tempt because of their policy-making power and fi-
nancial interest in the newspaper. A further suggestion
is that those responsible for miscarriages of justice oc-
casioned by trial by newspaper be made liable to the
prosecuting government for expenses incurred, e g cost
of a new trial after reversal and remand. Id. at 21i-18.
One of the persons participating in the writer's poll
suggested that the newspaper be made liable in civil
damages to a vindicated defendant.
136 "Laws which create crime ought to be so explicit
that all men subject to their penalties may know what
acts it is their duty to avoid." United States v. Brewer,
139 U.S. 278,288 (1891).
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must be whether, looking at the publication at the
time of publication, it is reasonably certain that the
defendant will be prejudiced if the jury is exposed
to the publicity. A publication meeting this test
constitutes at the tine of publication a clear and
present danger that the defendant will be preju-
diced thereby-i.e., that the sovereign's right to
prosecute and conduct a fair criminal trial will be
endangered-and can therefore be punished with-
out violating freedom of the press even if the dan-
ger never materializes--i.e., even if the information
is subsequently admitted as evidence. Of course,
subsequent admission would prevent the granting
of trial level remedies or reversal.
Since we are seeking to formulate explicit stand-
ards, perhaps at the outset we must eliminate the
sixth category of prejudicial material-miscella-
neous material which may inflame the jury against
defendant. Although such material can have the
prejudicial effect sought to be eliminated, it is not
likely to have this effect in so many cases as will
material in the first five categories. Moreover,
whereas the first five kinds of material are suscepti-
ble of rather precise definition, this last type is not.
Thus, while recognizing that such miscellaneous
material can in some cases be prejudicial, it would
be wise not to include it for present purposes.
Applying the time element aspect of the test of
prejudice developed above, publication of material
in any of the first four categories (confessions,
criminal activities, tangible evidence, and state-
ments of possible non-witnesses) prior to its actual
use as evidence at the trial (or, if never admitted,
prior to termination of the trial) would constitute
conduct so prejudicial as to warrant holding the
publisher in contempt. Publication of material in
the fifth category (proceedings out of jury's pres-
ence) would constitute such conduct if it occurred
before the jury was allowed to consider the object
of dispute in the proceeding (or, if never so allowed,
before termination of the trial). If the jury is extra-
judicially exposed to material in any of the five
categories and the material is not later admitted as
evidence, the defendant should obtain relief by
trial level remedies or reversal.
The next logical question is how these standards,
for purposes of securing "voluntary" adherence
thereto by the fear-of-possible-future-consequences
method, or for purposes of putting a potential
contemnor on notice of what conduct is prohibited,
are to be conveyed to those affected by them.
Presentation of the Standards
It has been suggested that the Bar advance
standards for the press to follow.in Such a standard
would be merely advisory as to those not members
of that Bar, however, and probably could not com-
mand respect from a substantial portion of the
press. A standard presented by the Bar would not
necessarily conform to the treatment, by courts in
its locality, of claims of prejudicial publicity or in-
vocation of constructive contempt, unless those
courts first formulated the standards in a judicial
opinion. If the highest court of a state did formu-
late a standard, however, subsequent dissemina-
tion thereof to the press by the local Bar would aid
in achieving the desired result and would consti-
tute a valuable public service. So long as the or-
ganized Bar fails to enforce its Canon 20 as against
its members, however, it would seem unrealistic to
expect more from the press vis-A-vis a Bar-promul-
gated standard of conduct for the press in the ab-
sence of exercise of active external sanctions.
If, as has been argued, publication of the enu-
merated kinds of material can constitutionally be
punished as contempt, any state court authorized
to promulgate rules of court could constitutionally
promulgate a rule specifying these categories and
announcing that publication prior to admission as
evidence, or termination of trial if not admitted,
of categorized material concerning criminal cases
pending before or being tried by jury in that court
will be dealt with as a contempt of court.
Should a court decide to expand the existing
methods of reversal and trial remedies rather than
to enlarge its current use of the contempt power,
it could, if so authorized by local law, render an ad-
visory opinion that the enumerated kinds of ma-
terial would, in the future, occasion reversal and
granting of trial level remedies which might make
trial in effect impossible. Or, perhaps, a State At-
torney General could issue a similar statement as
to his interpretation of what the law now requires.
Evaluation of Expansion of Existing Metlwds
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that either of
the possible expansions here suggested will be gen-
erally adopted, at least at the present time.
Although a few courts have begun to liberalize
the tests of juror impartiality and proof of preju-
dice, it is doubtful that this will cause such fear on
the part of a substantial segment of the press as to
make any significant inroads on the present scheme
17 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
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of crime news reporting. Courts still adhering to
the stricter tests are loath to amend their stand for
fear that jury trials will thereby be rendered im-
possible in the context of our modem society with
its extensive news coverage of criminal cases. What
these courts do not realize is that, by temporarily
rendering effective criminal jury trials next to im-
possible in cases extensively covered, by an im-
moderate press,"' they may well insure that the
judicial system shortly thereafter will no longer be
plagued by the problem of prejudicial publicity.
And since most state judges are elected, and
federal judges, though appointed for life, are bound
by a Supreme Court decision ruling against their
possession of statutory power to punish construc-
tive contempts,1"' the possibility of punishing
enough constructive contempts to deter news me-
dia from publishing material here deemed preju-
dicial seems remote.
Before considering the use of more stringent
means against the press, however, it would perhaps
be advantageous to consider the possibility of pre-
venting publication of the enumerated prejudicial
information by the indirect method of preventing
the information from ever reaching the news media
for publication.
V: PUNIsimiNG DIVULGENCE
Effective prohibition of divulgence to the press of
prejudicial material for purposes of publication by
the press 40 would render unnecessary the imposi-
tion of any positive external sanctions against the
news media, thus avoiding the argument that the
latter would run afoul of freedom of the press.,
However, punishing those who divulge prejudicial
material for publication may not be practicable in
light of the newsman's statutory privilege, recog-
nized in a minority of the states, against being
compelled to reveal the source of his information.'4 '
133 See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
139 See note 40 supra, in Part I of this article.
M See Note, 50 J. Cnmt. L., C. & P.S. 374, 381-82
(1960).
M It may be that freedom of speech can more easily
be regulated than freedom of the press, since, although
the "clear and present danger" test applies to both,
perhaps a clearer, more present, greater danger is re-
quired to restrict freedom of the press than freedom of
speech, due to the particularly high reverence and re-
gard in which freedom of the press is held.
I,- While neither the first amendment nor the com-
mon law operates to grant this privilege, Garland v.
Torres, 259 F.2d 545, 550-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317,
367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d
181 (1963), some 10 states grant the privilege by statute.
Certain policy considerations may also dictate
against the adoption of a non-divulgence statute.
Three general types of persons contribute to the
press most, if not all, of the crime news deemed
prejudicial in the preceding discussion. They repre-
sent (1) persons occupying the status of agents of
the government, (2) persons independent of both
the government and the news media, and (3) per-
sons who are agents or employees of the news me-
dia.
(1) Government agents. The most obvious reason
for divulging to the press material with may
prejudice a jury against a prospective or present
criminal defendant is to secure his arrest and con-
viction. While this end serves the individual in-
terests of prosecutors and law enforcement officers,
whose duty it is to protect the public from crime
and to alleviate public anxiety concerning unsolved
crimes, and who may release prejudicial material to
the press in order to gain favorable publicity for
themselves, 43 agents of executive and legislative
branches of government may also contribute such
material for similar considerations.' Since all
these persons are officers of the state, their be-
havior as it affects the governmental process of
conducting trials can be regulated by the state.
45
Moreover, since members of the Bar and police
officers hold positions of privilege rather than of
right, the local Bar Association and Police Depart-
See Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's
Source: A Compromise Proposal, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 243
(1959). See also Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing &
Publishing Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (L.
1964). Although the privilege presently exists in but a
small number of states, it would appear that any con-
certed effort to punish divulgence may provide impetus
for enactment of newsmen's-privilege statutes in other
states, the legislatures of which would, no doubt, be
influenced by press interests.
'41 See Wessel, Controlling Prejudicial Publicity in
Criminal Trials, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 105 (1964). For
examples of publicity emanating from the prosecution,
see Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), affirming per
curiam 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); United States v.
Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951); People v. Brom-
mel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 913, 364
P.2d 845, 849 (1961). See Sowle, A Free Press Vs. Fair
Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, July 5, 1964, sec. 2, p. 2.
Perhaps in a jurisdiction which is liberal in reversing
convictions on prejudicial publicity grounds, a defense
attorney might be inclined secretly to release informa-
tion prejudicial to his client in hopes of subsequent re-
versal. See Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840, 852-53 (1950).
M Such persons may include local politicians, mem-
bers of government agencies, and legislators. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (governor's
committee); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107
(1st Cir. 1952) (congressional committee).
14- Cf. Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300,
67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
1965]
CAROLYN JAFFE
ment, respectively, could prescribe standards of
non-divulgence with internal disciplinary action
for non-compliance. Enforcement and observance
of ABA Canon 20 alone would substantially aid the
problem."' The argument that preventing divul-
gence to the press will harm society by keeping
relevant information from the proper authorities
simply does not apply, since the source of informa-
tion here consists of those authorities.
(2) Private Individuals. Private individuals, in-
dependent of both the government and the news
media, who may make statements for publication
which might be prejudicial include witnesses, vic-
tims, family or friends of the victim or of the ac-
cused, accomplices, and suspects. Although it could
constitutionally be effected, punishing such private
individuals for making disclosures to the press in
order to prevent similar disclosures in the future
may be inadvisable. Here, the argument that pre-
vention of disclosure would be against the public
interest inasmuch as pertinent information may be
made unavailable to the authorities does apply,
since persons possessing otherwise inaccessible in-
formation relevant to the solution of a crime, may,
for various reasons, fear going to the authorities.
In such cases, a criminal might go free but for
the individual's willingness to tell his story to a
newsman. Furthermore, since such private persons
are not likely to repeatedly be in possession of
information re crime and probably would lack ac-
tual knowledge of a sanction invocable against
them, punishing them would serve no substantial
deterrent purpose.
(3) Employees of News Media. While employees
of news media can be treated as private individu-
als insofar as their function of supplying the media
with information for publication is concerned, the
arguments against the punishment of divulgence
by private individuals do not apply to reporters
and "informers." Unlike members of the Bar and
police officials, newspaper employees are not sub-
ject to effective disciplinary action of any organized
group. Although the American Society of News-
paper Editors has adopted a set of ethical canons,
no disciplinary machinery exists for its enforce-
116 See Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and
Criminal Justice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964). Canon
20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, of course, applies to prosecuting and
defense attorneys alike. See State v. Van Duyne, 204
A.2d 841 (N.J. 1964), more fully discussed in note 122
supra, for an analysis of the Canon's scope, and for one
court's method of putting attorneys on notice that the
Canon will be enforced.
ment.147 Thus, the only possible sanction against
these persons is by state action. If a statute were
to punish acts of divulging prejudicial material
only when committed by employees of news media,
however, it would likely be held invalid as violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.14 The policy reasons favoring disclos-
ure by private persons not affiliated with the press
dictate against the universally applicable nondivul-
gence statute which would comply with the equal
protection clause. Consequently, although press
employees constitute an important source of prej-
udicial information, only those persons subject to
government regulation by virtue of their status as
officers of the state should be made subject to
sanctions for divulgence of prejudicial material to
the press.
In a state with a newsman's-privilege statute, a
statute or internal regulation against divulgence
would be totally ineffective unless the privilege
statute were either repealed or amended to permit
compulsion of disclosure of a newsman's source in
cases where application of the nondivulgence
statute or regulation is the reason for attempting
to discover the source.14 9
Although non-criminal punishment could prob-
ably be imposed by local Bar Associations and
Police Departments in such a way as effectively
to prevent divulgence of prejudicial information
to the press, imposition of criminal penalties by the
state would probably be a better method. Uni-
formity of incidence and substance throughout
the state, essential for the purpose of securing
that uniform compliance which is necessary to in-
sure that every criminal defendant within the
jurisdiction can exercise his right to a fair trial, is
attainable only by a state-wide statute. Moreover,
since a state legislature could emasculate non-
divulgence regulations by enacting an unqualified
newsman's-privilege statute, provisions to punish
divulgence should ideally be promulgated by the
legislature.
Even if the proposed non-divulgence statute
would effectively prevent the press from obtaining
147 See Will, supra note 120, at 212.
'"8 As an unreasonable classification. It is arguable,
though, that the classification is reasonable because it is
based upon the policy favoring disclosure by private
individuals not affiliated with the press.
149 Such amendment would render the statute similar
to the Arkansas statute, AxK. ANN. STAT. §43-917
(Supp. 1961), which, unlike other newsmen's-privilege
statutes granting an absolute privilege, excepts from its
operation communications made in bad faith and not in
the interest of public welfare.
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prejudicial material from those to whom the stat-
ute would apply, still some would reach the press
from those to whom it would not. The question
remains whether, if the non-divulgence statute is
not adopted, or is adopted but is ineffective since
much prejudicial material still reaches the press
from sources which are immune because of a news-
man's-privilege statute or because a prosecutor
consistently exercises his discretion not to prose-
cute under the non-divulgence statute, sanctions
more drastic than those already discussed and
dismissed as ineffective or improbable of exercise
should be invoked.
VI: PUNISHNG PUBLICATION
Since the earlier discussed "solutions" appar-
ently fail effectively to protect the criminal de-
fendant's right to a fair trial, and thus necessarily
fail to protect sovereign rights as well, I believe
that the answer to this remaining question must
be an emphatic "Yres."
The justification for making the right to a fair
trial apparently supersede freedom of the press is
that here, as in the obscenity and sedition cases,
what is essentially being safeguarded is the pub-
lic."' Just as the public is benefited by reasonable
restrictions on offensive and dangerous material,
so would it be benefited by reasonable restrictions
on prejudicial material-for the government is the
losing party when a miscarriage of justice occurs
as a result of the publication of prejudicial mate-
rial, and what is the government if not the public?
An analogy can be drawn from the recent case
of United States v. Fidler,"5' where the district
court rejected defendant's argument that freedom
of the press prohibited the federal government
from prosecuting him for violating section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act. 52 Defendant,
a newsman, had intercepted police radio messages
and divulged newsworthy portions to a radio sta-
tion. The court refused to grant defendant's motion
to dismiss the information, holding, inter alia,
that since freedom of the press is not absolute,
the first amendment did not prohibit application
of section 605 to defendant. In Fidler, the con-
gressional right, embodied in a criminal statute, to
keep the lanes of interstate commerce free and
untrammeled was held to supersede freedom of
the press. Proposed legislation to punish publica-
to See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text, in
Part I of this article.
'5 202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
15248 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
tion of prejudicial material would be passed by the
state for the purpose of maintaining its sovereign
right to preserve a fairly administered judicial
system. If the one can supersede freedom of the
press, why cannot the other?
A statute punishing the publication of preju-
dicial material would be analogous to a statutory
or inherent contempt power under which acts in-
terfering with the orderly administration of justice
are punishable, to the extent that the former
would enumerate and specify acts which fall within
the more general terms of the latter. The same
constitutional criteria should therefore apply to
both processes. Since publication of such material
constitutes a clear and present danger to the gov-
ernment's right to fairly administer criminal jus-
tice, a statute punishing publication should not
offend the first amendment.ln Moreover, enact-
ment of such a statute ciearly delineating the five
kinds of prejudicial material outlined aboveM and
providing for indictment and trial as for any other
statutory offense would be perhaps even more
palatable than use of the contempt power, inas-
much as the standards required would be unmis-
takable and available to all persons covered, and
since a valid objection to the contempt power-
that the judge whose courtroom was affected by
the contemptuous act summarily tries the con-
tempt action-is absent' 55
VII: PROPOSAL
A comprehensive statute encompassing both
divulgence and publication would be the best pos-
sible solution, short, of course, of voluntary re-
straint by the press. Since the non-divulgence and
prevention of publication sought is with regard to
exactly the same material, a single statute should
be utilized.1l '
Since the legislature will be considering a bill
which its members, as elected officials, will invari-
ably find repugnant, it seems provident to be will-
ing to settle for legislation covering less than all of
the kinds of material deemed prejudicial in the
earlier discussion. Although each of the five cate-
gories of information can properly be called preju-
dicial in the sense that a dear and present danger
is presented, and although a bill covering all five
15 See notes 46-64 supra and accompanying text, in
Part I of this article.
14 See notes 25-37 supra and accompanying text, in
Part I of this article.
155 See, e.g., Will, supra note 120, at 214.
165 See id. at 215.
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categories can constitutionally be drafted and
should initially be advocated, one has yet accom-
plished much if coverage of the most harmful of
the items is attained. Punishing divulgence or pub-
lication of information relating to confessions and
to previous criminal activity would seem to prevent
the publication of that material which is most
likely to be highly prejudicial in the most circum-
stances. Moreover, if material regarding confes-
sions and previous criminal activities cannot be
published, much of the material in the remaining
categories will be less prejudicial or perhaps even
devoid of the capacity to interest the public.
In order to increase the likelihood of enactment
into law of this or a similar proposal, a scientific
study should be conducted in order to establish a
causal connection between exposure to prejudicial
publicity and partiality.157 In light of press influ-
ence on legislation, at least some endorsement of,
or, at the very least, acquiescence in the proposal
by the press probably would, as a practical matter,
be necessary in order to have it enacted; tangible
evidence of a causal connection would likely lead
to endorsement by the more enlightened members
of the press. The foregoing should not be construed
to imply that there is a doubt as to causal con-
nection-only that this proof would increase the
chances of enactment of the proposed statute.1 8
In drafting a proposed statute, the time during
which divulgence or publication of the material
shall be punishable must be delineated. It has been
demonstrated that publication of prejudicial ma-
terial is in fact prejudicial, as that term has herein
been defined, if it occurs prior to admission of the
contents of the material as evidence in court. The
acts of divulgence or publication should be punish-
able if committed at any time after a criminal act
has been committed and before the material is
"' Cf. Roper, Public Opinion Surveys in Legal Pro-
ceedings, 51 A.B.A.J. 44 (1965); Sherman, The Use of
Public Opinion Polls in Continuance and Venue Hear-
ings, 50 A.B.A.J. 357 (1964). Contrary to the notion
that such a study would or could not prove fruitful is
the Second Circuit's use of public opinion polls as evi-
dence to show that the defendant in United States ex
rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963), did
not receive a fair trial. See FREE PREss-FAnR TRIAL, op.
cit. supra note 127, at 183-201. 66.13% of the persons
responding to the writer's poll agree that reliable sta-
tistics would make enactment of a statute or regulatory
measure more likely, but 12.10/ of those responding do
not believe that reliable statistics could be obtained.
See Tables I & VIII.
I's See FRaE PREss-FAIR TRIAL, op. cil. supra note
127, at 183-201, especially remarks of Mr. Harris
Steinberg.
admitted in evidence, or if not admitted, until
termination of the trial.
What was said earlier concerning expansion of
the constructive contempt power with regard to
the punishment to be imposed'12 is equally appli-
cable here. While a usual misdemeanor penalty
would probably deter the individual from divulg-
ing prejudicial material, only a substantial fine
and possible prison sentence will deter actual pub-
lication.
VIII: MODEL STATUTE
For implementation of the desired prohibitions,
it is necessary to embody the above proposals into
a definite structure. The statute which follows is
designed as a guide to any state' 60 which desires
to impose reasonable restrictions upon the divul-
gence and publication of specified prejudicial
material in order to assure that the constitutional
right to trial by an impartial jury will more often
be fact than fiction. The entire statute is intended
to represent the broadest possible measure which
could constitutionally be promulgated. However,
adoption only of the unbracketed portions will
strongly be advocated, since the more specific and
less restrictive the statute, the greater its deterrent
force, probability of enactment, and likelihood of
being found constitutional.'
An Act to Prevent the Dissemination of Prejudicial
Publicity62
§1. Subject to the exceptions set forth in §§2
1(c), 2 2(b), 2 3(b), 2 4(c), 2 5(b), and §3,
159 See note 135 supra and preceding and accompany-
ing text.
160 The substantive provisions of the statute could be
incorporated into the Code of a Bar Association or of
an association of newsmen, and could also be used as a
guide for possible police department regulations regard-
ing divulgence.
161 Part or all of the bracketed portions could be used
by local associations of lawyers, or of newsmen, or by
police departments if these groups desire to adopt
measures more stringent than those in the narrowest
statute. For these purposes, or for a state in favor of a
statute somewhat broader than that contained in the
unbracketed portions, the author would recommend
§2, 4(b)(1) in whole or in part, and §2, 5. The part
of §2, 44(b)(1) which could most advantageously be
included is that regarding the results of scientific tests.
162 Note to Model Statle
§1. "Criminal act" as used herein means an act which
constitutes a crime under the laws of the state; "trial"
is a state trial. The nature of the offense and its punish-
ment are to be determined by the state. See Tables VI &
VII for the results as to this last matter.
§2. Note that if material deemed prejudicial is di-
vulged or published during the specified time period, the
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any person responsible for the publication policy
or broadcasting policy of any newspaper, maga-
zine, radio station, television station, or any other
news-disseminating agency which publishes or
broadcasts, or any person formally connected with
act of so divulging or publishing is punishable as a vio-
lation of the statute regardless of subsequent events.
1, 3, 4(a) & 4(b) (i) are drafted in terms of statements
which may be prejudicial to any particular person, in-
asmuch as the kinds of statements therein described are
likely to be publicized at any time after a crime has been
committed, including the period before any person has
been officially accused of having committed it. On the
other hand, since statements described in 2 and
4(b) (2) are very unlikely, because of the nature of their
contents, to be publicized until after someone has been
officially accused of having committed a crime, these
paragraphs have been drafted in terms of statements
which may be prejudicial to any person officially ac-
cused of having committed a crime, rather than in
terms of any particular person. The reason for making
this distinction in the statute is to avoid the possibility
of an attack on its constitutionality on the ground that
it is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the states'
police power, in that it makes punishable an act not
reasonably certain to be harmful to the state. See, e.g.,
People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146, 172
N.E.2d 535 (1961). For example, if §2, 2 applied to a
statement concerning the criminal activities of any
particular person, a news article inadvertantly pub-
lished after a crime has been committed, perhaps as a
part of a study of the rehabilitation of ex-convicts,
which concerns the criminal record of someone, would
violate the statute. Similarly, if §2, 94(b)(ii) applied to
a statement reasonably tending to impair the defense
of any particular person to any crime, an article in which
one person called another a liar would violate the stat-
ute.
The time at which statements described in §2, 5
become subject to the statute is dearly delineated by
their very nature.
"Officially accused," as used herein, means arrested
and/or indicted. This definition would therefore include
one presently a defendent in a criminal case.
§2, 94(b)(1). Statements made by a homicide victim
which reasonably tend to incriminate any particular
person are inadmissible as evidence in court except un-
der certain circumstances [most commonly as "dying
declarations"; see, e.g., Cannon v. State, 225 Md. 543,
171 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906 (1961)], and the
prejudice which publication of such statements would
cause a defendant if they are not later admitted at the
trial is as immeasurable as it is obvious. "Scientific
tests" under the statute include those in the fields of
ballistics, fingerprints, handwriting identification, poly-
graphs, blood types, etc.
§2, 94(b) (2). The phrase "criminal act" is intention-
ally used here instead of "crime," with regard to the
defense of an accused. This choice was made in order to
prevent the possibility that one officially accused of a
particular offense for the commission of a criminal act
which may constitute more than one statutory offense
will be prejudiced with regard to his defense(s) to the
offense(s) of which he has not been accused. For ex-
ample, one who has been accused of manslaughter, but
later is tried for murder, may be prejudiced by the
publication of statements negating the defense of no
premeditation.
the administration of law, including its practice or
enforcement, who divulges to any newspaper,
magazine, radio station, television station, or any
other news-disseminating agency, at any time be-
tween the commission of an alleged criminal act
and the termination of the trial of any person for
that act, any statement deemed in §2 of this Act
to be prejudicial, shall be guilty of a
punishable by
§2. Any statement, whether of fact or opinion
or otherwise, which communicates information of
one or more of the following types, is deemed to
be prejudicial:
1. Confessions
a. That any person has confessed to any
crime, or
b. The contents of any confession, or any
part thereof.
c. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish the
fact or contents of a confession after it
has been admitted as evidence at the
trial.
2. Criminal Activities
a. That any person officially accused of
having committed any crime has ever
committed a crime on another occasion,
or has been convicted of, acquitted of,
arrested for, accused of, or indicted for
the commission of any other crime.
b. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 2(a) after it
has been admitted as evidence at the
trial.
3. Tangible Evidence
a. That any tangible evidence has been ob-
tained, whereby such evidence reason-
ably tends to connect any particular
person with the commission of any crime.
b. Exceptions: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish (1) any
statement covered by §2 3(a) after the
evidence has been admitted at the trial,
or (2) that tangible evidence has been
obtained, provided that the statement
does not reasonably tend to connect any
particular person with the commission
of any crime.
4. Statements of Unswom Witnesses
a. That any person is of the opinion that
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any particular person has committed any
crime, or
b. That any person has made a statement,
whether as fact or opinion or otherwise,
or the contents of any statement, or any
part thereof, which (1) reasonably tends
to connect any particular person with
the commission of any crime (such state-
ments include, but are not limited to:
identifications by any person of a partic-
ular person as the perpetrator of any
crime; statements attributing to a par-
ticular person a motive for the commis-
sion of any crime; statements made by
a homicide victim; and results or infer-
ences drawn from results of scientific
tests); or (2) reasonably tends to dis-
credit or otherwise impair the defense of
one officially accused of having commit-
ted any criminal act (such statements
include, but are not limited to: state-
ments which reasonably tend to impeach
the credibility of one who has been offi-
cially accused of any criminal act or of
any person who has been or is reasonably
expected to be called to testify at the
present or pending trial of the accused;
or to attribute to one who has been
officially accused of any criminal act a
motive for the commission of any crimi-
nal act; or to establish the sanity of one
who has been officially accused of any
criminal act).
c. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 4(a) or (b)
after it has been admitted as evidence
at the trial.
5. Closed Court Proceedings.
a. Transcripts, reports, or summaries of
occurrences taking place during the
course of proceedings from which the
jury has been excluded by the trial
court.
b. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 5(a) concern-
ing a proceeding held to determine ad-
missibility of evidence or of a confession
after the evidence or confession has been
admitted at the trial.
§3. General Exceptions-This statute shall not
apply to:
1. The divulgence or publication, after a trial
has commenced, of statements deemed by
§2 to be prejudicial, if
a. A defendant has waived his right to trial
by jury, or
b. A trial court has ordered that the jury
be confined during the course of the trial.
2. The divulgence or publication, at any time
after a crime has been committed, of the
fact that a particular person has been offi-
cially accused of having committed the
crime.
IX: SoMEx PROBLEMS AND SPECULATIONS
Many problems, beyond the scope of this paper,
would exist even if the proposed solution were
adopted. For example, the statutory scheme above
was intended to be promulgated at the state level.
What of a defendant who commits an act-such as
robbing a federal bank-which constitutes both a
state and a federal offense? His federal trial may
be conducted after termination of the state stat-
utory period of prohibition on divulgence and
publication. And as to an act which violates only
federal law, no state statute would apply to punish
divulgence or publication. Perhaps the federal
government could pass a similar statute appli-
cable to all news media subject to the commerce
power. Almost every newspaper and radio or tele-
vision station would be covered. But to what
criminal acts would the divulgence and publica-
tion relate? Acts in violation of federal law, or of
the laws of one state, or of more than one? Pre-
sumably, if an act violated any penal law, publica-
tion in the lanes of interstate commerce of material
herein defined as prejudicial with regard to that
act could constitutionally be covered by a federal
statute.
Another untreated question relates to proceed-
ings subsequent to termination of an initial crimi-
nal trial. What of the defendant who appeals his
conviction? Maybe even appellate judges can be
unconsciously influenced by material regarding the
defendant published after judgment of conviction
and before disposition of the appeal. And what
will happen to the defendant who succeeds in ob-
taining reversal and new trial? What if the jury
impanelled at his retrial read, after his first con-
viction and before retrial was ordered, that he con-
fessed, and the confession was coerced and cannot
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be introduced? Carrying this line of reasoning to
its inevitable conclusion, publication of prejudicial
material at any time when a new trial may still be
granted--i.e., until a defendant has exhausted his
state remedies, failed to get certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court, and failed in his
petition for federal habeas corpus and in his ap-
peals to the federal Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court from its denial--can
prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial.
What if the prosecutor refuses to enforce the
statute? Mandamus lies only to compel perform-
ance of a clear legal duty; the prosecutor has dis-
cretion. Prohibition lies to correct a flagrant abuse
of discretion-but try and prove it against our
kind-hearted prosecutor.
What if the newsman says, "My experienced
attorney advised me that the material I divulged
(or published) was not within the statute"? Pre-
sumably, the individual states' legal rules regard-
ing mistake of law and mistake of fact as a defense
in criminal cases would govern. But these defenses
are singularly misunderstood and misapplied due
to their inherent conceptual difficulty.
What of the "exceptional case"? In the case of
Lee Harvey Oswald, for instance, one who pub-
lished facts regarding his Communist sympathies
and personal background could persuasively argue
that this action was necessary, or at least justifi-
able, to avert national panic.16 Oswald did not
confess, but had he done so, publishing that fact
would probably have been in the national interest.
Even in the case of the "Boston Strangler," whose
activities have considerably upset a large number
of citizens, perhaps publication of a confession, if
obtained, could be justified, though not so much
as in the Oswald case.11
If the Oswald-type case should be treated differ-
ently from the garden variety case, in what manner
should this be accomplished? One might argue
that a person who kills a President of the United
States waives all rights against having facts about
himself published, much as in the right to privacy
cases in tort law one may be held to waive that
right if he is a public figure. But this argument
presumes that, before trial according to established
procedures required by the federal constitution,
13 But see Editorial, Canon 35 Is Not Enough, 48 J.
Am. Jun. Soc'y 83, 84 (1964), quoting from the Report
of the Warren Commission.
1" See generally Wessel, supra note 143, for a discus-
sion of weighing the interests for and against disclosure
and publication.
we have decided that he did commit the act. In
an exceptional case the prosecutor's discretion not
to prosecute the publisher might be relied upon.
Or, perhaps, a declaratory judgment might be ob-
tained permitting publication. A procedure might
be devised for obtaining a court order permitting
publication which, in absence of the order, would
violate the statute. Probably such procedure
would have to be incorporated in the statute itself.
Any procedure for obtaining immunity from opera-
tion of the statute, though, should be strictly dealt
with, lest the statute become in effect inoperative.
Another possible problem is that if most official
or seemingly sanctioned comment regarding crimi-
nal cases ceases, it may be replaced by rumors not
carried by the news media which may be even
more detrimental to the defendant.
Certain beneficial indirect effects may result if
lurid crime news is no longer published. The news-
papers may well find they must improve the qual-
ity of their product if they are to keep selling
papers. Perhaps more important, citizens will tend
to view the administration of criminal justice as
what it was meant to be within our system of
government, rather than as what current journal-
istic practices may lead them to believe.
CONCLUsION
It is at best a difficult task to propose sanctions
designed to achieve a desired result where, by the
very nature of the situation, the most effective
sanctionors are at the mercy of the sanctionees.
Even if a statute such as that proposed cannot be
adopted and extensive use of the constructive con-
tempt doctrine cannot be realized for this Machia-
vellian reason, liberalization of the tests of juror
impartiality and standard of proof of prejudice,
which would result in fair trials in many cases and
in increased difficulty in obtaining valid convic-
tions in those cases receiving flagrant and exten-
sive publicity, may well serve as an indirect sanc-
tion that eventually will yield the desired result.
Perhaps in the final analysis, the greatest service
an interested lawyer can perform in this area is to
observe the ABA Canons of Ethics, to prod his
Bar Association toward concern, and to talk loudly
and write profusely about promulgating anti-pub-
lication statutes, suspecting all along that his goal
is not really enactment of a statute, but rather
the playing of a personal role in the campaign to
coerce the press into enlightened self-restraint.
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EXPLANATORY NOTE
The following material includes a letter (Ap-
pendix I) distributed to participants in the Annual
Short Course for Defense Attorneys in Criminal
Cases and for Prosecuting Attorneys given at
Northwestern University School of Law in the
Summer of 1963; a letter (Appendix II) mailed in
March, 1964 to participants and lecturers in the
following Short Courses and Conferences, all held
at Northwestern University School of Law: the
1962 and 1963 Short Courses for Defense Attor-
neys in Criminal Cases and for Prosecuting Attor-
neys, the 1963 Short Course for Newsmen in Crime
News Analysis and Reporting, the 1962 Conference
of Police Officials, Prosecuting Attorneys, Defense
Counsel, Judges, and Legislators, and the 1962
Conference on Prejudicial News Reporting in
Criminal Cases; the Questionnaire (Appendix III)
distributed to them; and (Tables I-IX) results of
the poll, reflecting the responses of the 124 persons
who answered the Questionnaire.
APPENDIX I
Letter to Participants in Annual Short Course for
Defense Attorneys in Criminal Cases




Since I intend to practice in the field of criminal
law, I am particularly interested in and concerned
about the problem of prejudicial publicity. I have
researched the case law and law review articles on
this subject in the preparation of a law review
article [Comment, The Case Against Trial by News-
paper: Analysis and Proposal. 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
217 (1962)], and have formulated therein a pro-
posed solution to the problem. I concluded that a
statute, punishing both divulgence to the press
and publication by the press of certain specified
kinds of information, could be constitutionally
promulgated. Such a statute would enable both
the sovereign prosecuting the case and the criminal
defendant to try that case in a court of law before
an impartial jury, rather than before a jury which,
because of exposure to the extrajudicial "trial"
conducted in the newspapers, cannot possibly be
fair and impartial. The harm suffered by the state
because of reversals occasioned by prejudicial pub-
licity is no less acute than that suffered by the
defendant who is unfairly convicted.
I was graduated from Northwestern University
School of Law in June, 1963, and during the com-
ing academic year will be working toward the de-
gree of Master of Laws under a Ford Foundation
grant. In expanding my article into a thesis, and
with a view toward urging the actual adoption of
measures to protect against "trial by newspaper",
I would like to go beyond my academic research
and ascertain what criminal lawyers, both prose-
cutors and defense attorneys, think of the proposed
plan. For this reason I ask you to read the pro-
posed statute, reproduced on the attached sheets,
and answer the questions which follow it. The
completed questionnaire will be collected from you
at the end of the short course. Results of this sur-
vey will be incorporated in the thesis, but identity
of the participants will be kept confidential.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Sincerely,
APPENDIX I
Cover Letter Mailed to Persons Polled,
Winter 1964
Dear Sir:
Since I intend to practice in the field of criminal
law, I am particularly interested in and concerned
about the problem of prejudicial publicity. I have
researched the case law and law review articles on
the subject in the preparation of a law review ar-
ticle [Comment, The Case Against Trial by News-
paper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
217 (1962)], and have formulated therein a pro-
posed solution to the problem. I concluded that a
statute, punishing both divulgence to the press
and publication by the press of certain specified
kinds of information, could be constitutionally
promulgated. Such a statute would enable both
the sovereign prosecuting the case and the criminal
defendant to try that case in a court of law before
an impartial jury, rather than before a jury which,
because of exposure to the extra-judicial "trial"
conducted in the newspapers and other news
media, cannot possibly be fair and impartial. The
harm suffered by the government because of re-
versals occasioned by prejudicial news reporting is
no less acute than that suffered by the defendant
who is unfairly convicted.
I graduated from Northwestern University
School of Law in June, 1963, and am a member of
the Illinois Bar. During the current academic year
I am working toward the degree of Master of
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Laws under a Ford Foundation grant. In expand-
ing my article into a master's thesis, and with a
view toward urging the possible adoption of
measures to protect against "trial by newspaper,"
I would like to go beyond my academic research
and ascertain what people actually in contact with
the problem-prosecuting and defense attorneys,
police officials, judges, and journalists-think of
the proposed plan. For this reason I ask you to
read the proposed statute, reproduced on the at-
tached sheets, and answer the questions which
follow it.
Your cooperation in returning the completed
questionnaire to me in the enclosed self-addressed,
stamped envelope will be deeply appreciated. Re-
sults of this survey will be incorporated in the
thesis, but identity of the participants will be kept
confidential.





1. Does existing law in this area (i.e., motions
for change of venue, continuance, etc.; revers-
ing convictions shown to have been based upon
the influence of publicity; cautionary instruc-
tions) adequately protect a defendant's right
to a fair trial?
2. If not, would a change in the test of impar-
tiality be a satisfactory remedy? Would it be
possible to apply, as a practical matter, a test
less rigid than the prevailing one (that a pros-
pective juror who has read about the case and
has formed an opinion as to the defendant's
guilt cannot be discharged for cause if he
testifies that he nonetheless can render a fair
and impartial verdict based solely on the evi-
dence presented in court)?
3. Could the courts' contempt power, statutory
and/or inherent, be utilized to punish news-
papers which publish material prejudicial to a
criminal defendant, or would such citations
always violate the First Amendment? Would
exercise of this power help to solve the prob-
lem?
4. Does the proposed statute, considered as a
whole, violate freedom of speech and/or free-
dom of the press? Would your answer be
different if 13, 4, & 5 of §2 were omitted?
5. If you think the statute as here presented is
unconstitutional, what changes would you
make to render it constitutional?
6. (A) Can the state impose restrictions (i.e.,
deterrence through punishment, not prevention
through prior restraint) upon public or quasi-
public officials which it could not impose upon
the general public? (B) If so, are private de-
fense attorneys so classified along with prose-
cutors and police officials?
7. In light of both policy considerations and the
question of constitutionality, should the regu-
latory measure be in the form of a statute as
here presented, or in the form of a regulatory
measure adopted by a specific group (e.g.,
Bar Association, Police Department) to apply
only to those subject to its sanctions? If a
statute, what should be the nature of the of-
fense, and what punishment should be pro-
vided? If an internal regulation, what punish-
ment?
8. Would such a statute (or regulation) be more
likely to be enacted if the enacting body were
confronted with reliable statistics indicating
that there is, in fact, a correlation between
exposure to prejudicial publicity and partiality
or bias or jurors?
9. (A) Is there any possibility that the problem
can be solved through internal control exer-
cised by the newspapers? (B) Would such a
solution be encouraged by the preparation of
advisory standards to be followed by the press,
prepared by a State Bar Association, State
Supreme Court, or the like?
10. In your opinion, what kinds of material are the
most likely to be harmful to a criminal de-



















































* 12.44% of those responding "yes" (32 persons)
qualified their xesponse by stating that a more liberal
test would be impractical to apply.
t See Table IV for responses to Question 5.
$ See Tables V, VI, & VII for responses to Ques-
tion 7.
§ 11.29% of all responding mentioned competition
and commercialism as a negative factor.
I See Table IX for responses to Question 10.
TABLE II
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 2
TEST OF IMPARTIALITY SUGGESTED BY PERSONS
RESPONDING "YES" OR AYBE"
PERCENTAGE FIGURES
(N = 41)
Read or Formed Mi No
Heard* Opinionst iscellaneous Description
12.20 14.63 9.76 63.41
* Prospective jurors who stated they had read or
heard of defendant would be chaliengeable for cause.
t Prospective jurors who stated they had formed an
opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence would be
challengeable for cause even if they also stated that
they could lay their opinions aside and decide solely
on the evidence presented in court.
TABLE III
REASONS FOR RESPONSE OF "No" To QUESTION 3
PERCENTAGE FIGURES
(N = 59)
Unconsti- Elected Burden on Miscella- No Reason
tutional Judges Judiciary neous Given
40.68 23.73 8.48 11.86 15.25
TABLE IV
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 5
CHANGES IN STATUTE SUGGESTED BY PERSONS




Eliminate §2, 3 & 4 .................. 1.69
Eliminate §2, 2 & 3 .................. 3.39
Eliminate §2, 3, 4 & 5 ................ 5.09
Eliminate §2, 1, 3 &4 ................ 1.69
Eliminate §2, 2, 3, 4 & 5 .............. 1.69
Eliminate §2, 3, and all of §2, 4 except
with regard to scientific evidence ........ 1.69
Eliminate §3 ........................... 1.69
Narrow scope of §1 ..................... 6.79
Prohibit only editorial interpretation of
prejudicial facts ...................... 3.39
Prohibit everything until admitted in evi-
dence ............................... 8.48
Allow procedure for exposing defects in law
enforcement ......................... 3.39
Make non-penal ........................ 5.09
Require only equal space and time for de-
fense ............................... 1.69
Require statutory reversal of conviction
where prosecution or police is source of
prejudicial publicity ................... 1.69
No answer ............................. 52.54
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TABLE V
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 7 PERCENTAGE FIGURES
(N = 124)
Internal No
Statute Repula- Both Other Neither Answer
tion
39.51 28.23 8.07 4.03 10.48 9.68
TABLE VI
NATURE OF OFFENSE INDICATED By THOSE





* Persons responding "contempt" described a scheme
whereby statutory contempt would be used, with
publication of prejudicial material constituting a per se
contempt.
TABLE VII




Fine and/or Imprisonment ........... 44.35
Very Heavy Fine ................... 7.26
Increased Punishment* .............. 8.06
Fine Only ......................... 3.23
* Prescribing increased punishment for subsequent
offenses and/or where offense with which defendant is
charged is very serious.
TABLE VIII
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 8: PERSONS INDICATING




Reliable Statistics Could Not Be Ob-
tained ........................... 12.10
Statute Would Not Pass For Political
Reasons Regardless of Confrontation
With Reliable Statistics ............ 3.23
No Answer ........................ 84.67
TABLE IX
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 10: PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS
INDICATING KINDS OF MrATERIAL CONSIDERED MOST




Criminal Background ............... 32.26
Everything but fact of arrest until after
admitted in evidence .............. 25.00
Prejudicial conclusions indicating
guilt ........................... 18.55
"Testimony" not yet in evidence ..... 14.52
Gory details of offense ............... 13.71
Epithets .......................... 4.03
"Crusades" to get someone convicted. 2.42
Miscellaneous* ..................... 9.68
No Answer ........................ 20.16
* Included were sex involvements, political views,
nature of offense per se, inaccurate reporting of facts,
attributing a motive to defendant, guilt by associ-
ation, and race.
